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Brodlieb: Familial Employees: Exclusion from the Bargaining Unit

NOTE

FAMILIAL EMPLOYEES: EXCLUSION FROM
THE BARGAINING UNIT
The United States Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v. Action
Automotive, Inc.1 signifies that the majority of the Court is not
ready to restrict the statutory authority of the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB" or "the Board") to define bargaining units.
1. U.S. -, 105 S.Ct. 984 (1985).
2. The National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB" or "the Board") has the duty to determine an appropriate unit for collective bargaining under Section 9(b) of the National Labor
Relations Act ("NLRA" or "the Act"), 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. § 159 (1982)). In deciding what workers to exclude from a unit, the Board will look for
substantial differences in working conditions. The following factors will be examined:
[A] difference in method of wages or compensation; different hours of work;
different employment benefits; separate supervision; the degree of dissimilar qualifications, training and skills; differences in job functions and amount of working time
spent away from the employment or plant situs . . . ; the infrequency or lack of
contact with other employees; lack of integration with the work functions of other
employees or interchange with them; and the history of bargaining.
Kalamazoo Paper Box Corp., 136 N.L.R.B. 134, 137, 49 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1715, 1716
(1962).
For example, a company may employ a clerical staff, salespeople, and mechanics. If these
groups do not have the same benefits, hours, and pay structure, the Board may find that their
different employment interests outweigh the basic overall community of interest of the employees in the employer wide unit. Three units rather than one would then be appropriate for
collective bargaining. The employees, in their appropriate unit, are still protected in their
NLRA Section 7 rights "to self organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to
bargain collectively through representatives of their choosing.
... 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982).
Some workers, however, can be excluded completely from an appropriate unit. The Board
may exclude any individual employed by his or her parent or spouse from an appropriate unit
of employees. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1982) (stating in pertinent part: "The term 'employee' shall
include any employee, .... but shall not include. . . any individual employed by his parent or
spouse.
...) This familial exclusion stemmed from the Congressional belief that persons
employed by parents and spouses "did not need the protection of the Act because of the close
relationship between employer and employee. A bargaining unit, or for that matter concerted
activity, was apparently thought unnecessary and also unwanted in such homes." Note, Confidential Employees: A Recommendation for Uniformity, 31 CLaV. ST. L. REV. 339 (1982).
Problems arise when the Board uses section 9(b) of the NLRA to exclude other workers
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The Court has held that the Board did not exceed its authority under

section 9(b) of the National Labor Relations Act 3 when it excluded
some family members from a bargaining unit even though the employees had enjoyed no special job related benefits. The majority of

the Court found that "[t]he Board's policy regarding family members, although not defined by bright-line rules, is a reasonable application of its 'community of interest' standard." 4 The six to three di-

vision of the Court" and the Board's shifts in policy over the years'
on familial exclusions from the bargaining unit suggest
the need for
7
clarification and scrutiny into this area of labor law.
A discussion of the issues in the Action Automotive decision
must begin with a consideration of the development of the "community of interest" standard, the "expanded community of interest"
standard, and the "special status" test. The case law from the cir-

cuits and the NLRB on familial exclusions from the bargaining unit
will be highlighted in this Note. An examination of the standards
will reveal that the "expanded community of interest," proposed by
who happen to have familial relationships with management. Both the union and the employer
have a stake in these exclusions. In representation elections the workers are asked to decide
whether to unionize. Both the union and the employer want to win these NLRB elections but
the final decision is made by the "subjective minds of the employees, each with varying backgrounds, moods, desires, and motivations." Voegler, Employer Objections to the Conduct of
NLRB Elections, 4 GLENDALE L. REv. 1 (1979-80).
How does the employee who happens to have a familial relationship with management
vote? The union might want to challenge the vote of a mother, niece, or brother of the employer on the grounds that the unit was inappropriate and that certain persons have improperly
been allowed to vote. The employer may want to set aside an election that the union has won
by challenging the allegedly improper exclusion of people. "The ultimate inquiry is whether or
not the employees grouped together share a 'community of interests' or whether some employees who also share this 'community of interests' have been kept out of the unit." Id. at I.
3. The Act states in pertinent part: "The Board shall decide in each case whether, in
order to assure to employees the fullest freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed by this
Act, the unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining shall be the employer unit,
craft unit, plant unit, or subdivision thereof." 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1982).
4. Action Automotive, Inc., U.S. at
, 105 S. Ct. at 988.
5. Chief Justice Burger delivered the opinion of the Court and was joined by Justices
Brennan, White, Marshall, Blackmun and Powell. Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion in
which Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor joined.
6. While only an individual working for his parent or spouse is expressly excluded by
§ 2(3) of the Act, the Board has relied on a "community of interest" standard, an "expanded
community of interest" standard, or a "special status" test to exclude other relatives.
7. Just as the Board has followed a zig-zag course in applying these standards, see
NLRB v. Caravelle Wood Products, 504 F.2d 1181, 1184 (7th Cir. 1974), the circuit courts
also have been in conflict as to which standard is the most appropriate. Linn Gear Co. v.
NLRB, 608 F.2d 791, 795 (9th Cir. 1979). Furthermore, when objections to a NLRB election
are filed, the relationship of the union, workers and employer can remain "in limbo" for several years while the Board, circuit courts and even the Supreme Court decide the issue. See
Voegler, supra note 2, at 2.
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the Seventh and Ninth Circuits,' is the one most appropriate "to
assure to employees the fullest freedom in exercising their rights." 9
During the 1984 term, in NLRB v. Action Automotive," the
Supreme Court considered whether or not the Board may exclude
from the bargaining unit employees who are related to the owners of
a closely held corporation if the Board has not found that the relatives enjoyed any special job-related benefits. The controversy
originated in January 1982 with the contested election of the Retail
Store Employees Union, Local 40, United Food and Commercial
Workers International Union as the exclusive collective bargaining
representative in two employee bargaining units of Action Automotive, Inc.," a retail automobile parts and gasoline dealer. Unit A
consisted of the store and warehouse employees at the nine stores of
the corporation while Unit B consisted of the office clerical employees at one location. The composition of Unit B included Diane Sabo,
the wife of one of the owners of the corporation. When the votes in
Unit B were counted, four were for the union, three against. However, each side challenged enough ballots to place the outcome in
doubt. The union's challenges included Diane Sabo's ballot.
In the Decision and Order dated June 24, 1982,12 a three member panel of the Board reaffirmed that a majority of the employees
in both bargaining units had selected the union. The Board relegated
to a footnote the reasons for sustaining the union's challenge to Diane Sabo's ballot."3 The decision lacked an analysis of the "community of interest" standard which resulted in Sabo's disqualification.
Furthermore, there was no discussion of the union's allegations regarding Sabo's special privilege. Sabo's disqualification was justified
by the conclusion that her interests were different from those of the
other clerical employees. Action Automotive petitioned the court to
review the NLRB's order. Action Automotive maintained that the
Board had improperly disqualified not only Diane Sabo, but Mildred
Sabo. The mother of the three Sabo brothers who owned and man8. Linn Gear Co., 608 F.2d at 796.
9. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1982).
10. U.S. _
105 S.Ct. 984 (1985).
11. Action Automotive, Inc., 262 N.L.R.B. 423, 110 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1399 (1982).
12. Id.
13. Id. at 424, n.4, I10 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1399. "In addition to the Hearing Officer's
finding that Diane Sabo, the wife of the president and an owner of the Employer, did not share

a community of interest with employees in Unit B, Members Jenkins and Zimmerman found
that the evidence also established that she enjoyed special privileges. Member Hunter would
have sustained the challenge to Sabo's ballot solely on the fact that she enjoyed special privileges." Id.
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aged the company, Mildred Sabo had been prohibited from voting in
the bargaining unit. 4
In contrast to the Board's cursory treatment of the challenges,
the Sixth Circuit, upon appeal, cited the following facts: the corporation was owned in equal shares by three brothers who made all policy decisions and were actively involved in the company's daily operation. Diane Sabo was the general ledger clerk who worked with
other clericals under the supervision of an office manager. Mildred
Sabo lived with one of the owners and spoke to all of her sons
daily. 15 The court used a "special status" test 6 to determine whether
the interests of Diane and Mildred Sabo were so allied with the interests of management that their votes should not have been counted
in the union's election. In the Sixth Circuit, "special status" was established when the court found a familial tie plus special job-related
benefits.' 7 After examining the wage and hour schedule and the procedure for supervision of the two women, the court found that management had accorded no special privileges to Mildred Sabo. The
court found one instance of special treatment for Diane Sabo: her
work schedule was established for her convenience. The Sixth Circuit held, however, that one finding of special treatment was not sufficient evidence of "special status."' 8 Therefore, the Board would not
be allowed to exclude either Diane or Mildred Sabo.
Other circuits have been imprecise when establishing standards
for determining whether relatives of corporate stockholders should be
excluded from the voting unit. In NLRB v. Caravelle Wood Products (Caravelle1),'9 the Board petitioned the Seventh Circuit to enforce the Board's bargaining order on Caravelle Wood Products
Company. The company challenged the election of the union since
wives and sons of corporate stockholders and department heads had
been excluded from the voting unit. The court held that the employ14. Action Automotive, Inc. v. NLRB, 717 F.2d 1033 (6th Cir. 1983).
15. Id. at 1034.
16. Id. at 1035.
17.

See generally NLRB v. Hubbard Co., 702 F.2d 634 (6th Cir. 1983) (the "special

status" test was applied to the son-in-law of the corporation's president and majority stockholder when his ballot was challenged by the union; the court considered his familial tie and
also examined his work schedule); Cherrin Corp. v. NLRB, 349 F.2d 1001 (6th Cir. 1965)

(the work schedule and fringe benefits of the daughter of the corporation's secretary were
examined); NLRB v. Sexton, 203 F.2d 940 (6th Cir. 1953) (the court refused to find "special
status" solely on a familial relationship). See also cases cited infra note 56 (excluding lowlevel managers on the basis of a "special status" test).
18.
19.

Action Automotive, Inc., 717 F.2d at 1035.
466 F.2d 675 (7th Cir. 1972).
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ees whose parents or spouses were "substantial shareholders" 2 in a
closed corporation were "employees" under section 2(3) of the
NLRA.21 Thus, the Seventh Circuit would not allow the Board to
automatically exclude a relative who was not otherwise expressly excluded by the Act from voting in a representation election.

The Board had relied on Foam Rubber City #222 to make its
attempted familial exclusion.2 3 In Foam Rubber City #2, the Board

compared a corporation comprised solely of two brothers to a partnership.

4

In a partnership, a son of one of the brothers could be

excluded under section 2(3) of the Act. Therefore, a son of a twenty
percent stockholder should be similarly excluded.2 5 The analogy

failed, however, in Caravelle I because the ten Paradiso family
members owned seventy percent of the stock. The Board's alternative
position had been that the Paradiso relatives should have been ex-

cluded under section 9(b) of the Act in any event because a familial
relationship automatically nullified any "community of interest"
with the other employees.26
More than ten years earlier, the Board had attempted to apply

this per se rule when the vote of an employer's nephew had been
challenged. 7 Nevertheless, the Sixth Circuit had limited the Board's
28
authority.
The Seventh Circuit demonstrated more flexibility in NLRB v.
20. See id. at 676 (the Paradiso family owned seventy per cent of the stock); Cerni
Motor Sales, 201 N.L.R.B. 918, 82 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1404 (1973) (a substantial shareholder
must own at least fifty percent of the stock before his or her spouse or child can be excluded
under § 2(3) of the NLRA).
21. NLRB v. Caravelle Wood Products, 466 F.2d at 678.
22. 167 N.L.R.B. 623, 66 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1096 (1967) (the son of the corporation's
president who owns half the stock of the company is not an "employee" and thus is not includable in the bargaining unit).
23. 466 F.2d at 676.
24. 167 N.L.R.B. at 624, 66 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1098.
25. Id. at 623, 66 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1097-98.
26. Id. at 624, 66 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1098. See supra note 2 and accompanying text
for the factors the Board has used to determine the existence of a "community of interest."
27. NLRB v. Sexton, 203 F.3d 940 (6th Cir. 1953).
28. We find no justification for the exercise of discretion on the part of the Board,
by virtue of Section 9 of the Act, to exclude from the appropriate bargaining unit
and from participation in the election for the selection of a bargaining agent any
persons on the basis of family relationship other than those specifically excluded
under Section 2(3).
Id. at 940. Section 2(3) is not an implied restriction on Section 9(b). The Senate Report on
the bill that became the Wagner Act states: "For administrative reasons, the committee
deemed it wise not to include under the bill agricultural laborers, persons in domestic service
of any family or person in his home, or any individual employed by his parent or spouse." S.
Rep. 573, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1935). See also, H.R. RaP. 972, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 8
(1935) (The definitions in Section 2 "are for the most part self-explanatory.").
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Caravelle Wood Products (Caravelle I).2" The court remanded the
case and suggested a number of factors which might have been
considered:
how high a percentage of stock the parent or spouse owns, how
many of the shareholders are related to one another, whether the
shareholder is actively involved in management or holds a supervisory position, how many relatives are employed as compared with
the total number of employees, whether the relative lives in30 the
same household or is partially dependent on the shareholder.
The examination of such factors would not, however, have uncovered
privileges or more favorable working conditions under the Sixth Circuit's "special status" test. 31 The Sixth Circuit required a showing of
special job related privileges not only when the challenged employee
was the son-in-law of the company's president and majority stockholder, 32 but also when the employee was the wife of the company's
president, and the challenge was-the-inclusion of that employee into
the bargaining unit.3 3 On the other hand, the Seventh Circuit focused on the strength of the familial relationship itself as well as its
potential influence on the employer-employee and employee-employee interaction. This is the substance of the "expanded community of interest" standard.3 4
On remand, the Board in Caravelle I applied the court's "expanded community of interest" standard. The Board found that seventy percent of the stock of the Company was owned by the Paradiso
family who "serve as directors, occupy most of the key offices of the
Company, are active in its operation, and hold most of the supervisory positions." 35 The sons were minors who attended school and
worked part-time under their father's supervision. Because both the
sons and the wives lived at home, the Board presumed their financial
dependence.36 Thus, despite the application of the Caravelle I guide29. 466 F.2d 675 (7th Cir. 1972).
30. Id. at 679.
31. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
32. NLRB v. Hubbard Co., 702 F.2d 634 (6th Cir. 1983).
33. Action Automotive, Inc., 717 F.2d 1033 (6th Cir. 1983).
34. See NLRB v. Caravelle Wood Products, 504 F.2d 1181 (7th Cir. 1974) [Caravelle
If]". . . Caravelle I fashioned an 'expanded'community of interest' standard that permits the
Board to exclude employees on the basis of family relationship-without regard to job related
factors-provided the factual finding implicitly required by the guidelines is made in each
case." Id. at 1187. See supra text accompanying note 29 for a listing of the relevant factors.
35. Caravelle Wood Products, 200 N.L.R.B. 855, 856, 80 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3411
(1972).
36. Id. at 856, 80 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 3412.
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lines, the Board was able to exclude the relatives. The Board found

the presence of special privilege, but limited discussion of this issue
to a footnote to the decision.3 7 The Board emphasized that the "special status" test was not the basis for the familial exclusion.

Caravelle still refused to bargain with the union. The Board's
decision to exclude family members was once again brought before

the court (Caravelle 11).38 The company insisted that a "special status" test must be used to exclude familial employees from the repre-

sentation unit.39 The Regional Director had previously not found any
relatives who had enjoyed substantial job related benefits.40 Thus the
use of this test by the court would have allowed the challenged employees to vote in the election and presumably defeat the union.

The Caravelle H court traced the Board's history of handling
representation elections which included employees who were related
to management. It was noted that early Board decisions had at-

tempted a per se exclusion by finding no "community of interest"
where there was a relationship between the employee and em-

ployer. 4 For example, the Board could exclude a nephew or a son of
a corporation's president from the bargaining units.42 When challenged by the Sixth Circuit,4 3 the Board retreated from its use of

this irrebuttable presumption. It held that "the mere coincidence of
a family relationship between an employee and his employer does

not negate the mutuality of employment interests which an individual shares with fellow employees, absent evidence that because of

such relationship he enjoys a special status which allies his interest
with those of management. '44 Thus, the impact of the decision was
that a brother, brother-in-law, or nephew by marriage who is related
37. Id. at 856, 80 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 3411. "While the usual punching-in time for
regular employees was 7 a.m., the vice president's wife was permitted to report for work about
9 a.m."
38. 504 F.2d 1181 (7th Cir. 1974).
39. Id. at 1183.
40. Id. at 1183 n.5.
41. Id. at 1184. In some cases it is the employer who seeks or agrees to the exclusion of
the employee-relative from a bargaining unit. See, e.g., NLRB v. Warner, 587 F.2d 896 (8th
Cir. 1978); McMahon Transportation Co., 124 N.L.R.B. 1092, 44 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1602
(1959). But see, Parisoff Drive-In Market, 201 N.L.R.B. 813, 82 L.R.R.M. 13 (BNA) 1342
(1973) (comparing employee-relatives to confidential employees whom the Board has historically excluded from the bargaining unit generally at the request of employees). See generally
Voegler, supra note 2.
42. P.A. Mueller and Sons, Inc., 105 N.L.R.B. 552, 32 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1229 (1953).
43. NLRB v. Sexton, 203 F.2d 940 (6th Cir. 1953) (cited in Caravelle 11, 504 F.2d at
1184).
44. International Metal Prods., 107 N.L.R.B. 65, 67, 33 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1055, 1056
(1953).
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to two partners of a company would be entitled to vote in a representation election.45 Such a relative is presumed to have a common interest with the other employees in "rates of pay, wages, hours of
employment, or other conditions of employment."' 46 Consequently,
the Board more closely examined the special job related privileges of
any relative whose vote was challenged for evidence of allied man47
agement interest.
The Caravelle II court determined however, that it was unnecessary and impractical for the Board to undertake this investigation.48 In his dissent in InternationalMetal Products,member Murdock stated that family ties could still interfere with the employees'
rights "to organize among themselves and to bargain collectively
without interference, restraint or coercion. '49 A relative would likely
find it easier to approach management during business hours or
would have access to management away from work at social or family gatherings. Other employees who must bargain through a statutory representative would not have such informal opportunities to
discuss hours and wages with the "boss." 50 Furthermore, a relative
could be in a position to directly receive the benefits of a profitable
business, and might forego a special employee privilege for a share
of the profits. Such a direct interest in the economics of the business
could conflict with the collective bargaining efforts of the other employees for higher wages and shorter work hours. Member Jenkins
reasoned that the fear that internal union information might be conveyed to the employer could "inhibit adequate and accurate expression of views and freedom of action on the part of the membership." 51 Just as any intrusion of a representative of management in
union activities would cause suspicion, so could the presence of a
45. Id.
46. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1982).
47. See generally Cherrin Corp. v. NLRB, 349 F.2d 1001 (6th Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 981 (1966); Uyeda v. Brooks, 365 F.2d 326 (6th Cir. 1966).
48. 504 F.2d at 1187.
49. 107 N.L.R.B. at 68, 33 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1056 (Murdock, mem., dissenting).
Member Murdock dissented in part from the majority's opinion that close relatives of manage-

ment would be included in the bargaining unit unless there was an affirmative showing of
"special status." Murdock discussed the practical grounds for excluding close relatives of management especially when the business was small and closely held. Id.
50. Pargas of Crescent City, 194 N.L.R.B. 616, 617, 78 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1712, 1713
(1971). Member Jenkins dissented from the majority's opinion which allowed a wife of the
employer's manager, who had no stock interest, to vote in the representation election because
she had no "special status." Jenkins discussed the practical grounds for excluding close relatives of management. Id. at 617-18, 78 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1714.
51. Id. at 617-18, 78 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1714.
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niece, son-in-law or sister in the bargaining unit cause uneasiness.52
A relative would not be excluded because he or she would likely vote
against the union in a representation election, as such exclusion

would violate the neutrality rule mandated by the Supreme Court.5 3
However, a relative could be excluded based on the possibility that

he or she might not share the same interest in employment conditions as the other employees. 54
The Seventh Circuit, in Caravelle II,5 affirmed the "expanded

community of interest" standard enunciated in Caravelle L Consequently, the Board must now examine several factors, in addition to

special job-related privileges, in order to determine whether the familial relationship is such that would require the exclusion of family
members from the bargaining unit.56
In 1979, the Ninth Circuit also adopted in Linn Gear Co. v.
NLRB the "expanded community of interest" standard established
by Caravelle I and Caravelle II.5 The Board upheld the Regional
Director's challenge to a ballot which had been cast by the son of the

majority shareholder. The Regional Director found no "community
of interest." The father was majority stockholder of the controlling

company and active president of Linn Gear. In addition, his son
52. Id.
53. See NLRB v. Savair Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 270 (1973). The Court held that the
union's waiver of initiation fees for all employees who sign union authorization cards before a
Board representation election tends to interfere with employee free choice in the election.
"Any procedure requiring a 'fair' election must honor the right of those who oppose a union as
well as those who favor it." Id. at 278.
Without violating the Savair principle, the Board necessarily precludes individuals from
voting in the election for a unit when the Board excludes them from the appropriate bargaining unit. See Caravelle II, 504 F.2d at 1188 (Savair has never been construed to affect the
Board's authority to exclude from a unit employees who do not share a community of interest
with other employees because of their relationship with the employer). See also Brief for Petitioner at 19 n. 10, Action Automotive v. NLRB. 105 S. Ct. 984 (1985) (employees with no
community of interest may well oppose a union but this presumed opposition stems from their
divergent interests and thus is not the basis for their exclusion from the unit).
54. Caravelle I1, 504 F.2d at 1187.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1186. The Board can still exclude an employee-relative who is not aligned with
management on the basis of the Caravelle criteria if the employee has special benefits. For
example, the Board has excluded or included employee-relatives of low-level managers on the
basis of a "special status" test. See, e.g., Queens City Paving Co., 243 N.L.R.B. 71, 101
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1472 (1979) (son of general manager with no ownership interest included
absent special job privileges); Novi American, Inc.-Atlanta, 234 N.L.R.B. 421, 97 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 1317 (1978) (son of regional manager excluded only on basis of special privileges);
Weyerhauser Co., 211 N.L.R.B. 1012, 86 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1492 (1974) (daughter of branch
manager included in unit absent special privileges).
57. Linn Gear Co. v. NLRB, 608 F.2d 791 (9th Cir. 1979).
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lived at home. 8 However, the court concluded that because the son
paid room and board, he might be financially independent from his
father. This conclusion supported the theory that there was a "community of interest" with the other employees.
On remand, the court requested that there be a discussion of the
following facts:
(1) his relationship to the Union; (2) his communication with other
Union members; (3) his relationship with his father and other
members of his family; (4) special favors, if any, granted to him as
an employee; and (5) any other pertinent facts.5"
The court was unwilling to exclude automatically a son of a
substantial shareholder of a corporation under section 2(3) of the
Act as the Board had done in Foam Rubber City #2.60 The court
was reluctant to expand the statutory language of section 2(3) of the
NLRA. 61 Furthermore, the Board's per se exclusion of the son without a factual inquiry into whether he had shared a community of
interest with his fellow employees6 2 would "[have given] the Board
total discretion under section 9(b) to accomplish what it could not do
under section 2(3). ' ' 3 Section 2(3) of the Act specifically excludes a
spouse or child of an individual employer from the definition of "employee."' 64 Because certain groups are specifically listed, the implication is that all other relatives would qualify as "employees" under
the Act.
Therefore, the Ninth Circuit required the Board to use specific
guidelines when excluding a relative from the bargaining unit and
5 as well as the following
noted all the factors listed in Caravelle P1
additional factors: "(1) the activity, if any, of the employee in the
Union; (2) the total number of employees as against the number of
blood related employees; and (3) the overall ties and social activities
of the family involved." 6 In eliminating the original fourth factor of
58. Id. at 793.
59. Id. at 794.
60. 167 N.L.R.B. 623, 66 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1096 (1967); see also supra notes 22-24
and accompanying text.
61. See Linn Gear Co., 608 F.2d at 795; see also Caravelle I, 466 F.2d at 677. The
Seventh Circuit was alarmed at the "Board's discretion in interpreting statutory language." Id,
62. 608 F.2d at 793.
63. Id. at 795, (citing Caravelle1,466 F.2d at 678); see also NLRB v. Sexton, 203 F.2d
940 (6th Cir. 1953); see supra note 28.
64. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1982).
65. See supra text accompanying note 30.
66. 608 F.2d at 796.
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special favors,67 the Ninth Circuit removed the vestiges of a "special
status" test.
Although the Seventh,"' Eighth69 and Ninth Circuits 70 have
adopted the "expanded community of interest" standard, the Board71
and the Sixth Circuit 72 have continued to use the "special status"
test. A result of this conflict is an increase in challenges to representation elections. Thus the courts are inundated with needless litigation. Both the Board and incorporated family-run businesses need
clear consistent guidelines in this area of labor law.
In NLRB v. Action Automotive, Inc.,73 the Court held by a six
to three vote that the Sixth Circuit's "special status" test unduly
restricts the Board's authority to define bargaining units under section 9(b) of the Act. 74 The Court limited its review of the Board's
policy on familial exclusions to a "reasonable basis in law" 75 standard. Nevertheless, the Court seemed to endorse the "expanded
community of interest" standard enunciated by the Seventh Circuit. 76 First, the Court in Action Automotive cited the following
Caravelle I factors as relevant considerations for exclusion of relatives: (1) the financial dependence of the relative on management;
(2) the shared residence with the business owner; and (3) the degree
of "family involvement in the ownership and management of the
company." 77 The Court then referred to the factors listed in Caravelle 178 dismissing the Board's per se exclusion under the "community of interest" standard as being a "bright-line" approach disfavored since 1953. 79 The Court assumed that since 1953 the Board
had used either a variety of objective factors or a "special status"
test in making familial exclusions.
Since the Court has clearly relied on the Board's discretion in
67. See supra text accompanying note 59.
68. Caravelle If, 504 F.2d 1181 (7th Cir. 1974).
69. NLRB v. Warner, 587 F.2d 896 (8th Cir. 1978).

70. Linn Gear Co. v. NLRB, 608 F.2d 791 (9th Cir. 1979).
71. Tops Club, Inc., 238 N.L.R.B. 928, 99 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1292 (1978). For cases
approving the Board's exclusion or inclusion based on job privileges but, nevertheless, holding

that such a finding is not required, see NLRB v. Connecticut Foundry Co., 688 F.2d 871 (2d
Cir. 1982); NLRB v. Warner, 587 F.2d 896 (8th Cir. 1978); NLRB v. Jackson Farmers, Inc.,
432 F.2d 1042 (10th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 955 (1971).
72. Action Automotive, Inc. v. NLRB, 717 F.2d 1033 (6th Cir. 1983).

73. NLRB v. Action Automotive, Inc.,
74.

-

U.S.

75. - U.S.
76. See Id.
77.
78.
79.

-

U.S. -,

105 S. Ct. 984 (1985).

105 S. Ct. at 987.

-'
,

105 S. Ct. at 988. (citation omitted).

Id. (citing Caravelle I, 466 F.2d at 679).
466 F.2d at 679.
105 S. Ct. at 987-88.
U.S. -
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Action Automotive to exclude relatives (in this case the wife and
mother) from the bargaining unit, the Board should have been responsible for a thorough discussion of its decision. Unfortunately, the
Board's decision80 did not illuminate specific factors under the "expanded community of interest" standard' which it found relevant
for a finding of exclusion. If the board were to articulate more specific standards, the formation of bargaining units might be less disruptive to family-run businesses. Furthermore, the Board could in
the future easily revert to a "bright-line" or per se approach when
the record is empty or the discussion is abbreviated. Such a reversion
would inappropriately deemphasize an employee's right to join a
union and engage in collective bargaining.
The dissent in Action Automotive criticized the pro-union
stance of the majority.8 2 Justices O'Connor, Rehnquist and Stevens
would have the Board examine objective job characteristics when
forming bargaining units. 83 In other words, an employee-relative
could only be excluded if he or she met the "special status" test.
Although the dissent strongly emphasized the employee's right to refrain from unionizing, 4 the ramifications of the "special status" test
does not lead to a neutral situation. Consider the following scenario.
A relative-employee, with no special privileges, votes in a representa80. Action Automotive, Inc., 262 N.L.R.B. 423, 110 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1399 (1982).
81. Cf. Brief for Respondent at 23, Action Automotive, Inc. v. NLRB, - U.S. -, 105
S. Ct. 984 (1985) (Because the Board has not used the term "expanded community of interest" in either its post-CaravelleI decisions or its Brief, the Board is "obviously reluctant to use
this terminology because there is simply no legal basis for expanding the community of interest
standard." Id.).
When the Taft-Hartley Act was enacted, the House Conference Report on the Act stated:
[Courts] will be under a duty to see that the Board observes the provisions of
the earlier sections, that it does not infer facts that are not supported by evidence or
that are not consistent with evidence in the record, and that it does not concentrate
on one element of proof to the exclusion of others without adequate explanation of
its reasons for disregarding or discrediting the evidence that is in conflict with its
findings.
H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 56 (1947), reprinted in I NLRB, LEGISLATIVE HisTORY

OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AcT,

1947, at 505, 560 (1948).

82. - U.S. at _ 105 S. Ct. at 991 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
83.
- U.S. at
, 105 S. Ct. at 990 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Unjust results to the
employee-relative may result from both the majority's and the dissent's approach. Upon winning an election, the union would demand that only union members perform the work. Assuming that the employee-relative has been excluded from the union by either the "expanded community of interest" standard or the "special status" test, the jobs of these relatives will be in
jeopardy. The exclusion of confidential employees is not an analogous situation as their work is
not being performed by the unit employees. For a further discussion on this unjust result, see
Brief for Respondent at 38, Action Automotive, Inc. v. NLRB, - U.S. -, 105 S. Ct. 984
(1985).
84. - U.S. at
, 105 S. Ct. at 990 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol3/iss2/4

12

Brodlieb: Familial
Employees:
Familial
Employees Exclusion from the Bargaining Unit

tion election. The union wins. The relative is subsequently involved
in union activity, and is privy to confidential union information. The
dissenting Justices should understand the need to exclude such an
employee from the bargaining unit, especially in light of the dissent's
approval of NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Electric Membership
Corp.,85 in which employees who had gained access to confidential
information on labor relations were excluded from bargaining
units.86
Although the Board and the courts need to protect the employee
who does not wish to join the union, as the dissent in Action Automotive asserts, the "expanded community of interest" standard is
the one under which all employees can assert their section 7 rights.
The Board, in determining an appropriate bargaining unit, must "assure to employees the fullest freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed by this subchapter." 8 7 According to the Sixth Circuit, an appropriate unit contains all "employees" who have a "common interest in
the terms and conditions of employment." 8 8 The Fifth Circuit also
holds that an "employee" must be "sufficiently concerned with the
terms and conditions of employment" before he or she can be included in a unit. 9 Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit has stated in
Adrian Belt Co.90 that in order to determine an appropriate unit "a
key consideration is whether that employee shares a sufficient 'community of interest' with other members of the unit."'" The Ninth
Circuit would define this "community of interest" as the "common
interest in the terms and conditions of employment."9 2
Although a family relationship between an employee and an
employer does not negate the "community of interest," it should necessitate an examination on a case by case basis to determine to
what extent the relative is emotionally and financially dependent
&5. 454 U.S. 170 (1981). In contrast to the confused body of law on employee-relatives

vis-a-vis inclusion in the bargaining unit, for over forty years the Board has applied a labornexus test, to identify those employees who should be excluded from bargaining units because
of access to confidential business information. See id.; see also NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co.,
416 U.S. 267 (1974) (Board's exclusion of managerial employees from coverage under the Act
for over thirty years).
86. U.S. -, 105 S. Ct. at 991 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
87. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1982); see also 1950 NLRB ANN. REP. 39 (1951) (grouping
together employees who have substantial mutual interest in hours, wages and other conditions
of employment will resolve the unit issue).
88. Uyeda v. Brooks, 365 F.2d 326, 329 (6th Cir. 1966).
89. Shoreline Enter. v. NLRB, 262 F.2d 933, 944 (5th Cir. 1959).
90. 578 F.2d 1304 (9th Cir. 1978).
91. Id. at 1312. (citation omitted).
92. Linn Gear Co. v. NLRB, 608 F.2d 791, 796 (9th Cir. 1979).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1986

13

Hofstra
Labor
and Law
Employment
Iss. 3:2
2 [1986], Art. 4
Journal Law Journal, Vol. 3,[Vol.
Labor
Hofstra

upon the employer. The more dependent relative is more likely to
interfere with other employees' organizing and collective bargaining
efforts. Where there exists a close relationship, the danger of leakage
of confidential union information to the management is likely. Confidential workers have been excluded from an appropriate unit be93
cause they may divulge information of direct interest to the union.
Therefore, relatives who meet the "expanded community of interest"
standard should likewise be excluded because they too may disclose
to management relevant collective bargaining strategies. Even an appearance of familial closeness might arouse suspicion among the
other employees that the relative does not share the union's goals,
and could hinder the airing of labor grievances and frank discussions
of union strategies.
Section 2(3) of the Act narrowly defines the persons excluded
from coverage. While the Taft-Hartley Act 4 amended the section to
add independent contractors and supervisors to the excluded categories, the legislative history of the Act demonstrates that confidential
or managerial "employees" would not be excluded by specific statutory language. 95 Congress encouraged the Board to develop its own
law in this area.96 Although section 9(b) could be used by the Board
to exclude large numbers of workers because they held managerial
positions or had confidential or family relationships with management, the Supreme Court has held that the coverage of the Act
should be as broad as possible so that the rights of workers to selforganization and collective bargaining will be expanded rather than
97
narrowed.
93. See Grenig and Mukamal, Collective Bargaining: The Exclusion of "Confidential"
and "Managerial"Employees, 22 DUQ. L. REV. 1, 61 (1983).
94. Labor Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified as
amended at 29 U.S.C. § 101 (1976)).

95. Grenig and Mukamal, supra note 93, at 25.
96.

at

-,

Id. But see Brief for Respondent at 36, Action Automotive, Inc. v. NLRB,__ U.S.

105 S. Ct. 984 (1985). (Unions do not need the protection of the Board to exclude

employee-relatives. Under Section 8(b)(1)(A) of the Act, the union is free to exclude any

employee-relative who may disrupt the unit or convey confidential information to
management.)
97. NLRB v. Hearst Publication, 322 U.S. 11 (1944). But see Comparison of the
NLRA of 1935 with Title I of the LMRA of 1947, reprinted in 2 N.L.R.B., LEGISLATIVE

ACT, 1947, at 1661 (1948). (The language
in Section 9(b) of the Wagner Act, i.e. "to insure to employees the full benefit of their right to
HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS

self organization and to collective bargaining" was changed in the Taft-Hartley Act to "assure

to employees the fullest freedom in exercising the rights guaranteed by this Act." Id. at 16691670. Furthermore, the statutory right to refrain from engaging in concerted action was added

to Section 7 of the Act. Id. at 1666.); see also H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 7
(1947), reprinted in I N.L.R.B.,

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELA-

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol3/iss2/4

14

19861

Brodlieb: Familial
FamilialEmployees:
Employees Exclusion from the Bargaining Unit

To limit exclusions, the inquiry should focus on "labor relations

interests [of an employee which are] potentially at variance with
those of his or her employer and the power to resolve those variances

on an individual basis." 98 The Board or courts assume such a conflict
of interest when they automatically exclude a relative because he or
she is presumed to be more closely aligned with management. This

does not have the effect of limiting exclusions. On the other hand, a
large number of workers will not be removed from the Act's protec-

tion by using an "expanded community of interest" standard. The
Board and courts will examine the employment situation and the degree of family dependence. Only small, incorporated family-run busi-

nesses with a substantial number of workers will be affected. In such
situations, the potential for conflict involving labor relations is slight
because the relative is more apt to set wages, hours, and conditions
of employment through individual rather than collective bargaining
dealings. Even though a "special status" test would exclude the least

number of employees, it could also thwart the rights of the other
workers. "[A]n employee-relative may be 'special' in the-sense that
he does not share with his co-workers a common interest in the terms
and conditions of their employment, and yet not be sufficiently spe-

cial for the Board to find that he enjoys a 'special status.'

"99

While the "community of interest" standard is solely based on

inferred family loyalty, the "expanded community of interest" standard does not use loyalty or sympathy to determine exclusion.
Rather, the factors under that standard explore the actual authority
of the corporate management, the employment interests of the related worker, and the strength of the familial relationship with re-

spect to the employer-employee relationship of the non-related workACT, 1947, at 292, 298 (1948):
The bill prescribes rules for the new Board to follow in setting up units for
collective bargaining and in holding elections to determine whether or not employees
wish labor unions to bargain for them. These rules do away with practices of the old
Board by which it has subjected literally millions of workers to control by labor
unions notwithstanding that the employees did not wish the unions to represent
them and voted against the unions in the Board's elections.

TIONs

Id.
98. Grenig and Mukamal, supra note 93, at 58. (The authors feel that such an inquiry
would be preferable to using other factors since it would limit the scope of "managerial"
exclusions.).
99. Caravelle I, 504 F.2d 1181, 1189 (Stevens, Circuit Justice, concurring) (emphasis
added). See also Economy Cash Stores, 202 N.L.R.B. 930, 82 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1766 (1973)
(Employee-relatives are almost certain to find employers more receptive to their employment
concerns even without any discernable privileges. This particular access gives them a status not
shared by the rest of the employees.).
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ers. Because the Supreme Court chose to look beyond a loyalty or
sympathy standard before excluding a confidential employee from
coverage of the Act, 100 it seems reasonable to assume that the Court

would prefer the "expanded community of interest" standard for familial employees to a per se exclusion based on family loyalty.
The mandate from Congress is to decide in each case the appropriate unit.10 ' Therefore, the Board must not automatically sever an
individual from a unit. The premise should be that a common interest in employment conditions exists among employees. The Board
must then proceed further and examine the actual employment situation. In a non-familial situation, the Board has used the following
factors in determining the existence of substantial differences in interests and working conditions:
[1] a difference in method of wages or compensation; [2] different
hours of work; [3] different employment benefits; [4] separate supervision; [5] the degree of dissimilar qualifications; [6] training
and skills; [7] differences in job functions and amount of working
time spent away from the employment or plant situs . . . ; [8] the
infrequency or lack of contact with other employees; [9] lack of
integration with the work functions of other employees or interchange with them; and [10] the history of bargaining. 10 2

An application of the first four factors in a familial employeremployee situation would highlight any special privileges or benefits
of the "employee." Such a "special status" test does not recognize

that a relative who does not receive special treatment may still sub100. See NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Elec. Membership Corp., 454 U.S. 170
(1981) (The Supreme Court endorsed a "labor nexus" standard for excluding "confidential"
employees from collective bargaining units. The standard excludes employees "who assist and
act in a confidential capacity to persons who [exercise 'managerial' functions] in the field of
labor relations." Id. at 189 (citations and footnotes omitted). Not all employees who are confidants of their employer are excluded by this standard.); see also NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444
U.S. 672 (1980). The Board, using an "alignment with management" argument rather than
analyzing job conditions, argued that faculty should be covered under the Act because they
were not required to be loyal to management. The Court found that the actual duties and
responsibilities of the faculty rather than loyalty was determinative. Id. at 686.
The Board has recognized that employees whose decisionmaking (sic) is limited
to the routine discharge of professional duties in projects to which they have been
assigned cannot be excluded from coverage even if union membership arguably may
involve some divided loyalty. Only if an employee's activities fall outside the scope
of the duties routinely performed by similarly situated professionals will he be found
aligned with management.
Id. at 690 (footnote omitted).
101. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1982).
102. Kalamazoo Paper Box Corp., 136 N.L.R.B. 134, 137, 49 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1715,
1716 (1962).
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vert the organizing and bargaining efforts of the unit. Furthermore,
when using a "special status" test, the courts and Board have not
clearly defined the amount of special treatment needed to exclude
the relative. In Cherrin Corp. v. NLRB, 103 the court examined the
Board's decision regarding a relative who was not required to punch
a time clock, did not participate in the company's sick leave policy,
was not held accountable for absences, and was never disciplined for
tardiness.0
While the Board had viewed the benefits as evidence of "special
status," the Sixth Circuit characterized the Board's findings as based
on "flimsy evidence"' 10 5 and suggested that the court might have
ruled differently had the case been before it de novo. x08 The court
deferred to the Board's decision, however, because it could not say
that the "Board's findings are arbitrary and capricious, which is the
10 7
standard to be followed in representation proceedings."'
In NLRB v. Hubbard Co.,'08 the circuit court disagreed with
the Board, and held that working a special shift, less than half of
which included supervision of other employees, did not constitute
"special status." In Action Automotive, Inc. v. NLRB, the Supreme
Court held that special privileges were enjoyed by a relative who was
paid on a weekly rather than a hourly basis, was not required to
punch a time clock, and had a work schedule established for her
convenience. 0 9 The Sixth Circuit had found that her convenient
work schedule was the only example of special treatment, and did
not meet the requirements for "special status."" 0 The problem with
the "special status" test is the difficulty quantifying and qualifying
the job benefits which meet the test.
It is through an appropriate unit that an employee exercises his
or her guaranteed rights under the NLRA. The inclusion of relatives
whose interests are aligned with management could hinder the statutory rights of the group. On the other hand, the exclusion of a relative with common interests to the other employees in the bargaining
unit would deny the rights of the relative. While the problematic
"special status" test leads to inclusion, the "community of interest"
standard results in automatic exclusion. The Supreme Court en103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

349 F.2d 1001 (6th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 981 (1966).
Id. at 1003.
Id. at 1004.
Id. at 1006-07.
Id. at 1007.
702 F.2d 634 (6th Cir. 1983).
U.S. -,
105 S. Ct. 984 (1985).
717 F.2d 1033, 1034 (6th Cir. 1983).
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dorsed the "expanded community of interest" standard in the Action
Automotive decision. This standard is the most appropriate one "to
assure to employees the fullest freedom in exercising [their]
rights."1'11
This Note is dedicated to the loving memory
of my father, Clarence A. Hanson.
Judith Brodlieb

111. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1982).
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